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1 Introduction
A Bayes-Nash equilibrium of a Bayesian game is ex-post Nash, also called ex-post
stable, if with probability one, the realization of types and actions are such that the
profile of actions is a Nash equilibrium of the complete information version of the
game determined by the realized profile of types. Similarly, a Bayes-Nash equilib-
rium is called approximately ex-post Nash, or approximately ex-post stable, if, with
a probability approximately equal to one, the profile of actions is an approximate
equilibrium of the complete information version of the game determined by the pro-
file of types. Thus, ex-post stability, both in its exact and in its approximate versions,
can be interpreted as a no-regret condition since rarely will there be a player who can
gain more than a small amount by changing his action after observing the type and
the action of the other players.
Approximate ex-post stability has been shown by Kalai (2004) to be a property
of Bayes-Nash equilibria of sufficiently large semi-anonymous Bayesian games, where
semi-anonymity means that each player’s payoff is affected by the profiles of type-
action characters of the other players only through the distributions of these profiles.
More precisely, it is shown in Kalai (2004) that if a family of semi-anonymous Bayesian
games is fixed such that the set of payoff functions in this family of games satisfies
some uniform equicontinuity condition with respect to the distributions of the profiles
of feasible type-action characters of the rivals of a player, then Bayes-Nash equilibria
of games in this family are approximately ex-post Nash if the number of players in
the game is large enough. This result by Kalai (2004) assumes finite action and type
spaces.
In this paper, we extend Kalai’s ex-post stability result by allowing action and
type spaces of the players to be general compact metric spaces. The main motivation
of our work is that several game theoretic applications consider models where players’
types or actions may vary continuously in infinite sets. Standard examples are loca-
tion games or Cournot games in which quantities can be adjusted continuously. The
framework of general compact metric spaces also covers action and type spaces that
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are infinite dimensional subsets of function spaces. This case also arises naturally in
some models. We illustrate this in two examples given in Section 3. The first example
is a Cournot oligopoly game where the types of the players are given by their cost
functions and these functions may vary in an infinite dimensional compact subset
of the space of all real-valued functions on the action space. The advantage of this
formalization is that it avoids restricting firms’ cost functions to be specified by a
finite number of parameters (e.g., a constant marginal cost and a fixed cost), thus
allowing for a rich set of possibilities for firms’ cost functions.
Our second example is a variation of the Village versus Beach example in Kalai
(2004). The original example by Kalai (2004) considers a situation where each in-
dividual in a group of people, with an equal number of men and women, is asked
whether or not he or she would like to go the beach, the alternative being staying
in the village. Each man’s payoff is the proportion of women that his choice matches
and each woman’s payoff is the proportion of men that her choice mismatches. Our
example is similar, but instead of a single question, there are countably infinitely
many questions to which players can answer “yes” or “no”. This leads naturally to an
infinite dimensional action space, namely the space of all sequences of numbers zero
or one, where one stand for answering “yes”, and zero for answering “no”.
Another example (not worked out in detail in this note) which leads to compact
metric action spaces that are not given as subsets of Euclidean spaces would be a
Cournot oligopoly game placed into a context of commodity differentiation modeled
as in Jones (1984). In the model of Jones (1984), there is an infinite compact metric
space Ω of differentiated commodities, which are assumed to be divisible, and the
commodity bundles are the elements of the space M b(Ω) of bounded Borel measures
on Ω. Commodities that are close as points in Ω are interpreted as similar. The space
M b(Ω) is endowed with the weak∗-topology1, so that two commodity bundles are
topologically close not only if they contain the same commodities in similar quantities,
but also if they contain similar commodities in similar quantities, a notion of closeness
1This topology on M b(Ω) is the topology of pointwise convergence on the continuous functions
on Ω, evaluation being given by integration.
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of commodity bundles that is natural in a context of commodity differentiation. Now
in a Cournot game in such a setting of differentiated commodities, the action sets of
the firms, i.e., the sets of their potential output vectors, would be closed subsets of
M b(Ω), and assuming capacity constraints, these sets would also be bounded. As Ω
is a compact metric space, closed and bounded subsets of M b(Ω) are compact and
metrizable, so firms would have compact metric action spaces. Since the differentiated
commodities are assumed to be divisible, it would also be natural to allow for the
possibility that there is no finite upper bound on the number of different commodities
a firm actually produces, so that, even when the set Ω of commodities is given as a
subset of some Euclidean space, the action sets of the firms would not need to have
a finite dimensional representation.
An ex-post stability result that, like ours, allows for infinite action and type spaces
has been obtained by Deb and Kalai (2010) (see Deb (2008) for an earlier version
of that paper). Our setting differs from that of Deb and Kalai (2010) in several
important aspects. On the one hand, our setting is more restrictive since, unlike Deb
and Kalai (2010), we assume semi-anonymous payoff functions. On the other hand,
in the framework of Deb and Kalai (2010) the action and type spaces of players are
restricted to be compact subsets of some Euclidean space and it is assumed that, for
the ‖·‖1-metric and some constant M , each player’s payoff function is uniformly M -
Lipschitz continuous in his type-action character and uniformly M/(N − 1)-Lipschitz
continuous in the profiles of the type-action characters of the other players, where
N is the number of players in the game. In contrast, our result allows for general
compact metric action and type spaces, and the set of payoff functions in a given
family of games has to satisfy a uniform equicontinuity condition, but these functions
need not satisfy Lipschitz conditions. In fact, in our result, a uniform equicontinuity
condition is imposed only with respect to changes of a player’s payoff resulting from
changes of type-action characters of the other players; in particular, payoff functions
are allowed to be discontinuous in the owner’s type-action character.
Allowing for payoff functions that are discontinuous in the owner’s type-action
character is an advantage of our result over that of Deb and Kalai (2010) in addition
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to allowing for infinite dimensional type and action spaces. An example where this
additional flexibility may be important is provided again by the Cournot oligopoly
framework. Indeed, a typical feature of industrial production are set-up costs, i.e.,
when the level of production is expanded, then at some levels, costs may jump up-
wards since increasing the level of production may require, at those levels, additional
machines to be acquired or the production facility to be expanded. To cover this
properly in a model in which the level of production may vary continuously, one
has to allow for discontinuous cost functions, and hence for payoff functions that are
discontinuous in the owners’ actions.2
On the technical side, our paper shares with Kalai (2004) and Deb and Kalai
(2010) the use of results on the concentration of probability measures. This aspect
also makes our paper related with Azrieli and Shmaya (2011) where such results are
used to address the existence of approximate pure strategy equilibria in games with
complete information.
It is reasonable to expect that our result can be extended to a more general frame-
work. In particular, we expect that it is possible to dispense with semi-anonymity
using the techniques of Deb and Kalai (2010) and Azrieli and Shmaya (2011), and to
dispense with the assumption that players’ types are independent using the approach
of Gradwohl and Reingold (2010). We leave these issues for further research.
2 Main Result
Let A and T be non-empty compact metric spaces, fixed for the rest of this section.
Let S = T ×A be endowed with some product metric, and let M(S) be the space of
2Allowing for discontinuous payoff functions does not imply that the set of Bayes-Nash equilibria
is empty, a case in which our result would be trivial. In fact, in the context of a Cournot oligopoly
example, if all cost functions are lower semi-continuous (as they would be if discontinuities arise
due to set-up costs of new machines at different production levels), then, if revenue functions are
continuous in all players actions, each player’s payoff function is upper semi-continuous in his action
and continuous in the action of the other players. For this case, it follows from Dasgupta and Maskin
(1986, Corollary) that a mixed Bayes-Nash equilibrium exists.
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all Borel probability measures on S, endowed with the narrow topology.3 Note that
M(S) is compact and metrizable. Let ρ be any metric on M(S) which induces the
narrow topology.
We write 1s for the Dirac measure at any s ∈ S. If µ1, . . . , µn are any elements of
M(S), then
µ˜ = µ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ µn,
i.e., µ˜ is the product probability measure on Sn defined from the measures µ1, . . . , µn,
and, given i ∈ I and s ∈ S,
µ˜is = µ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ µi−1 ⊗ 1s ⊗ µi+1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ µn,
i.e., µ˜is is the product measure on S
n defined from µ1, . . . , µi−1, 1s, µi+1, . . . , µn. By s˜
we denote a generic element of Sn, and by s˜k its kth component.
Let C be the set of all real-valued functions v such that
(a) dom(v) is a closed subset of S ×M(S), denoting by dom(v) the domain of v;
(b) v is bounded and measurable for the subspace σ-algebra on dom(v) defined from
the Borel σ-algebra of S ×M(S).
We say that a subset K of C is bounded if sup{||v||∞ : v ∈ K} < ∞, where ||v||∞ =
sup{|v(x)| : x ∈ dom(v)}. We say that a subset K of C is uniformly equicontinuous
in the M(S)-component if given ε > 0 there is a δ > 0 such that for all v ∈ K,
|v(s, µ)−v(s′, µ′)| < ε whenever (s, µ),(s′, µ′) ∈ dom(v) satisfy s = s′ and ρ(µ, µ′) < δ.
Note that the property of being a subset of C that is uniformly equicontinuous
in the M(S)-component is topological, i.e., does not depend on the particular choice
of the metric ρ. This is so because M(S) with the narrow topology is compact and
therefore all metrics on M(S) that induce this topology are uniformly equivalent.4
3Recall that the narrow topology on M(S) is the smallest topology on M(S) for which all sets
of the form {µ ∈M(S) : µ(G) > α} are open, where G is an open subset of S, and α a real number.
4Recall that two metrics ρ1, ρ2 on a set X are uniformly equivalent if for every ε > 0 there are
δ1 > 0 and δ2 > 0 such that for any x, y ∈ X, ρ2(x, y) < ε whenever ρ1(x, y) < δ1 and ρ1(x, y) < ε
whenever ρ2(x, y) < δ2.
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We consider semi-anonymous Bayesian games defined as follows. There is a finite
set I = {1, . . . , n} of players. For each i ∈ I, player i’s action space Ai is a closed
subset of A, and player i’s type space Ti is a closed subset of T . Let Si = Ai × Ti for
each i ∈ I.
For each i ∈ I, νi denotes the individual type distribution on Ti. Type realizations
are independent among players. A mixed strategy (in distributional form) of player i
is an element σi of M(S) with σi(Si) = 1 such that the marginal on Ti is νi.
5 Given
a profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) of mixed strategies (a mixed strategy, for short), and some
mixed strategy σ′i of player i ∈ I, we write (σ′i, σ−i) for (σ1, . . . , σi−1, σ′i, σi+1, . . . , σn).
For all i ∈ I, player i’s payoff function is given by an element vi ∈ C such that
dom(vi) = Si ×Hi, where
Hi =
{
µ ∈M(S) : µ = 1
n− 1
∑
j∈I\{i}
1sj where sj ∈ Sj for all j ∈ I\{i}
}
.
The interpretation is that vi(t, a, µ) is player i’s payoff when he is of type t, plays
action a and faces the distribution µ = 1
n−1
∑
j∈I\{i} 1sj on S induced by the types
and actions of all other players. Thus, given a mixed strategy σ = (σ1, . . . , σn), the
expected payoff of player i is
Ui(σ) =
∫
Q
j∈I Sj
vi
(
s˜i,
1
n− 1
∑
j∈I\{i}
1s˜j
)
dσ˜(s˜) .
This concludes the definition of a semi-anonymous Bayesian game. Thus, a semi-
anonymous Bayesian game G can be described as a list G = (Ti, Ai, νi, vi)i∈I .
A mixed strategy σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) of a semi-anonymous game G is a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium of G if for each i ∈ I and mixed strategy σ′i of player i, Ui(σ) ≥ Ui(σ′i, σ−i).
For all s = (t, a) ∈ S, let t(s) = t. Given a Bayesian semi-anonymous game G and
a number ε > 0, an element (s1, . . . , sn) ∈
∏
i∈I Si is said to be ε-Nash in G if
vi
(
si,
1
n− 1
∑
j∈I\{i}
1sj
)
≥ vi
(
s,
1
n− 1
∑
j∈I\{i}
1sj
)
− ε
5This way of representing mixed or behavioral strategies was introduced into the literature by
Milgrom and Weber (1985); see this paper for a discussion.
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for all i ∈ I and s ∈ Si with t(s) = t(si). That is, (s1, . . . , sn) = ((t1, a1), . . . , (tn, an))
is ε-Nash in G if (a1, . . . , an) is an ε-equilibrium of the complete information version
G(t1, . . . , tn) = (Ti, Ai, 1ti , vi)
n
i=1 of G where players’ types are t1, . . . , tn.
Given a mixed strategy σ = (σ1, . . . , σn), for each player i ∈ I and type t ∈ Ti we
let
mi(t, σ) = sup
{∫
Q
j∈I Sj
vi
(
s˜i,
1
n− 1
∑
j∈I\{i}
1s˜j
)
dσ˜is(s˜) : s = (t, a), a ∈ Ai
}
.
Note that if σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, then for each i ∈ I this
supremum is attained for νi-almost all t ∈ Ti (see Lemma 6 in the next section).
Thus, in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, for νi-almost all t ∈ Ti, mi(t, σ) is the maximal
conditional expected payoff of player i given that his type is t and the other players
play according to (σ1, . . . , σn).
For real numbers ε > 0 and 0 < η < 1, a mixed strategy σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) of G is
said to be (ε, η)-ex post Nash if
σ˜
({
(s1, . . . , sn) ∈
∏
i∈I
Si : (s1, . . . , sn) is ε-Nash in G and∣∣∣vi(si, 1
1− n
∑
j∈I\{i}
1sj
)
−mi
(
t(si), σ
)∣∣∣ ≤ ε for all i ∈ I}) ≥ 1− η.
In this case, we also say informally that σ is approximately ex-post Nash. Thus,
a mixed strategy is approximately ex-post Nash if there is a high probability that
the realization of types and actions is such that the action profile is an approximate
equilibrium of the complete information version of the game determined by the re-
alized types. Furthermore, with the same probability, each player receives a payoff
in the complete information version close to the one he receives in the incomplete
information version.
Our main result states that in all sufficiently large semi-anonymous Bayesian
games with payoff functions selected from a subset of C that is uniformly equicon-
tinuous in the M(S)-component and bounded, all Bayes-Nash equilibria are approx-
imately ex-post Nash.
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Theorem. Let K be a subset of C and suppose K is uniformly equicontinuous in
the M(S)-component and bounded. Then, given ε > 0 and 0 < η < 1, there is an
N ∈ N such that the following holds for every n ≥ N : If σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) is a Bayes-
Nash equilibrium of a semi-anonymous Bayesian game G with n players whose payoff
functions belong to K, then σ is (ε, η)-ex post Nash.
Remark 1. Using the narrow topology on M(S) for the notion of continuity in the
theorem may be interpreted as follows. The narrow topology on M(S) reflects the
topology of the underlying space S of possible type-action characters in the sense
of treating two distributions on S as close whenever they involve similar type-action
characters with similar frequencies; e.g., if µ =
∑m
k=1 αk1sk and µ
′ =
∑m
k=1 α
′
k1s′k
are such that the type-action characters sk and s
′
k are close in S for each k, and the
frequencies αk and α
′
k with which they occur are close for each k, then the distributions
µ and µ′ are treated as close by the narrow topology. Thus the narrow topology
on M(S) in the continuity requirement in the theorem means that players, given
their own type-action character, get similar payoffs whenever profiles of type-action
characters of the respective rival players have distributions involving similar type-
action characters with similar frequencies.
Remark 2. In Kalai (2004), a semi-anonymous Bayesian game G = (Ti, Ai, νi, vi)i∈I
is defined as above except that, for each i ∈ I, vi is given as a real-valued function
defined on
∏
i∈I Si, and semi-anonymity is brought in by stipulating that vi(s˜) = vi(s˜
′)
whenever s˜i = s˜
′
i and
1
n−1
∑
j∈I\{i} 1s˜j =
1
n−1
∑
j∈I\{i} 1s˜′j . Player i’s payoff of a mixed
strategy σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) is
∫Q
j∈I Sj
vi(s˜) dσ˜(s˜).
Note that given a game specified in this way, there is, for each i ∈ I, a uniquely
determined function vˆi : Si × Hi → R such that vi(s˜) = vˆi(s˜i, 1n−1
∑
j 6=i 1s˜j) for all
s˜ ∈∏j∈I Sj (with Hi as defined above). In particular, given a mixed strategy σ,∫
Q
j∈I Sj
vi(s˜) dσ˜(s˜) =
∫
Q
j∈I Sj
vˆi
(
s˜i,
1
n− 1
∑
j∈I\{i}
1s˜j
)
dσ˜(s˜) ,
i.e., computing expected payoff in terms of vi or vˆi amounts to the same. Thus,
specification of a semi-anonymous game as in this note and specification of a semi-
anonymous game as in Kalai (2004) amounts to the same.
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3 Examples
In this section we present two examples to illustrate our main result. The examples
show, in particular, that infinite dimensional type and action spaces may arise nat-
urally and that the measurability and equicontinuity conditions in our result can be
satisfied in the context of such type and action spaces.
3.1 Cournot Oligopoly
An advantage of allowing for general compact metric type and action spaces in our
formalization is that one can easily incorporate rich payoff diversity. For instance, in
a semi-anonymous game where the payoff of each single player depends only on his
type-action character and the distribution of the actions of the other players, but not
on the types of these players, this can be obtained as follows: Let M(A) be the set
of all Borel probability measures on the universal action space A, endowed with the
narrow topology, and let the universal type space T be a non-empty set of bounded
measurable functions on A×M(A) which is compact for the sup-norm. Then for each
player i define the payoff function vi : Ti×Ai×Hi → R by setting vi(t, a, µ) = t(a, µA)
where µA denotes the marginal distribution of µ on A.
A concrete economic example where an approach like this is useful is provided
by the following Cournot oligopoly game (a similar example has been considered in
Carmona (2008)). The particular feature of this example is that each firm is uncertain
about the cost functions (and hence about the strategies) of the other firms and there
is a large set of possible cost functions that firms can have. In particular, the possible
cost functions are not restricted to be characterized by a finite number of parameter
(say, a constant marginal cost and a fixed cost). Furthermore, these costs functions
need not be continuous and thus may exhibit set-up costs.
Specifically, we formulate the Cournot oligopoly game as a Bayesian game G =
(Ti, Ai, νi, vi)i∈I as follows. The set I of players (i.e., firms) is I = {1, . . . , n}. Each firm
produces a non-negative quantity of a homogeneous good. Due to capacity constraints,
production cannot exceed a given level m > 0. Thus, for each i ∈ I, player i’s
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action set is Ai = [0,m]. Let T be a set of bounded measurable functions on [0,m],
endowed with the (relativized) sup-norm topology, such that T is compact for this
topology. The space T is the set of possible cost function of the firms; it may be
infinite dimensional and its members may exhibit set-up costs. Types of firms are
identified with cost function; thus, for each i ∈ I, player i’s type space is Ti = T .
Let the type distributions νi be any Borel probability measures on T . Note that even
though all firms in the game G have the same type space, there may be asymmetries
concerning costs as the type distributions νi may vary across firms.
Payoffs of firms are given as follows. If firms in the game G produce quantities
a1, . . . , an, then the market price of the good is P (
∑n
i=1 ai/n), where P : [0,m]→ R is
continuous.6 Thus, the revenue of firm i is P (
∑n
i=1 ai/n)ai. Therefore, firm i’s payoff
when it is of type ti, plays action ai and the other firms play (aj)j∈I\{i} is
P
(
ai
n
+
∑
j∈I\{i} aj
n
)
ai − ti(ai).
Now to formulate payoff functions in the notation of Section 2, let S = T × [0,m]
and recall from Section 2 that for each i ∈ I,
Hi =
{
µ ∈M(S) : µ = 1
n− 1
∑
j∈I\{i}
1(tj ,aj), (tj, aj) ∈ Sj for all j ∈ I\{i}
}
,
i.e., Hi is the set of the type-action distributions that can be generated by the players
j ∈ I\{i}. (Of course, the sets Si, i ∈ I, are the same here, and this is so for the sets
Hi as well.) Note that if firm i ∈ I chooses action a ∈ [0,m] and the distribution over
types and actions generated by the other firms in I is µ = 1
n−1
∑
j∈I\{i} 1(tj ,aj) ∈ Hi,
then the total output of all the firms in I can be written as a+(n− 1) ∫
S
proj[0,m] dµ,
where proj[0,m] denotes the projection of S onto [0,m]. Thus, in the notation of Sec-
tion 2, the payoff function vi : T × [0,m]×Hi → R of firm i is given by setting
vi(t, a, µ) = P
(
1
n
a+
(
1− 1
n
)∫
S
proj[0,m] dµ
)
a− t(a)
for (t, a, µ) ∈ S ×Hi.
6This formulation assumes that if the number n of firms is increased, then the set of buyers is
appropriately replicated.
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Now let
K =
{
v : T × [0,m]×M(S)→ R : for some n ∈ N\{0},
v(t, a, µ) = P
( 1
n
a+
(
1− 1
n
)∫
S
proj[0,m] dµ
)
a− t(a)
for all (t, a, µ) ∈ T × [0,m]×M(S)
}
where, as in Section 2, M(S) is endowed with the narrow topology. Note that in the
game G defined above, the payoff function of any firm i ∈ I is just the restriction of
some element v of K to the set T× [0,m]×Hi, this v being determined by the number
n of players. It is easily seen that all elements of K are measurable and that K is
uniformly equicontinuous in the M(S)-component and bounded (see the Appendix
for details). Thus our main result applies, showing that all Bayes-Nash equilibria of
the Cournot oligopoly game G are approximately ex-post Nash provided that the
number of players is sufficiently large.
Closing this example, we remark that there are several aspects in which the ex-
ample is not covered by the framework of Deb and Kalai (2010). First, the example
allows for an infinite dimensional type space. Second, the example allows for the re-
alistic case of production with set-up costs and hence condition (LC1) of Deb and
Kalai (2010) may fail. Finally, condition (LC2) of Deb and Kalai (2010) need not
hold either. Indeed, that condition would require the inverse demand function P to
be Lipschitz, where in our example this function may be any continuous function from
[0,m] to R.
3.2 A Matching Game with Infinite Questions
The example presented in this section can be seen as an infinite-dimensional version
of the Village versus Beach example in Kalai (2004). We construct a matching game
between men and women where each player is confronted with a list of “yes” or “no”
questions, and the action of a player is to give a list of answers. Each man wants to
match the answers given by women to the questions that are important to him and,
in contrast, each woman wants to mismatch the answers of men given to the questions
that are important to her.
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The case where there is only one question in the list corresponds to the Village ver-
sus Beach example in Kalai (2004). In our example, players may care about countably
infinitely many questions, the importance given by each player to each question being
determined by the player’s type. Thus our example addresses situations where there is
no finite bound on the numbers issues players may be interested in. For instance, the
list of question could include: “Do you like tennis?”, “Do you like opera?”, “Would
you like to go to the beach at 10am?” and so on. Or, more simply, the questions could
just ask for each integer k: “Do you like the number k?”
To formally define a game G = (Ti, Ai, νi, vi)i∈I in this regard, for each player
i ∈ I let the action set Ai be a non-empty subset of {0, 1}N. The interpretation is
that an element a = (a0, a1, . . .) ∈ Ai is a vector of answers, ak being the answer
to question k, and if ak = 1 (resp. ak = 0) this means that the answer to question
k is “yes” (resp. “no”). A natural special case is Ai = {0, 1}N. However, the case
where Ai is a proper subset of {0, 1}N is also of interest. For instance, let {Bj}∞j=0 be
a countable partition of N such that Bj is finite and non-empty for all j ∈ N and let
Ai be the set of a ∈ {0, 1}N such that |{k ∈ Bj : ak = 1}| ≤ 1 for all j ∈ N. Such
a specification of Ai corresponds to a situation where there is a countably infinite
number of issues (or activities), each of them having a finite number of (mutually
exclusive) alternatives. More concretely, one of the issues, say issue 4, might concern
the choice of going to the beach at 10am, going to the beach at 10:05am or staying
in the village; letting B4 = {8, 9}, any a ∈ Ai satisfies (a8, a9) ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1), (0, 0)}
under the above specification of Ai, with the interpretation that (a8, a9) = (1, 0)
means going to the beach at 10am, (a8, a9) = (0, 1) means going to the beach at
10:05am and (a8, a9) = (0, 0) means staying in the village.
The type of a player identifies his/her gender and how important each question
is for him/her. Thus the type of a player can be denoted as a pair (θ, ω) where
θ ∈ {−1, 1} with the interpretation that −1 stands for male and 1 for female, and
where ω = (ωk)k∈N is a vector of weights, with 0 ≤ ωk ≤ 1 for each k ∈ N, the
component ωk being the weight given to question k, expressing how important this
question is for the player. In order for the notion of payoff stated in the next paragraph
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to be well-defined, we assume that any such vector ω of weights has the property that
the sum
∑∞
k=0 ωk converges.
Suppose that the number n of players is even and that there are n/2 males and
n/2 females. We then define the payoff for player i ∈ I when he/she is of type
(θi, ωi) = (θi, (ωi,k)k∈N), plays ai = (ai,k)∞k=0 and the other players play (aj)j∈I\{i} by
θi
∞∑
k=0
ωi,k
∣∣∣∣ai,k − |{j ∈ I\{i} : θj = −θi and aj,k = 1}|n/2
∣∣∣∣ .
Thus for any player i, each question k matters for his/her payoff (a) by the importance
of this question for him/her as measured by ωi,k, (b) by how close his/her answer to
this question is to the fraction of players of the opposite gender who have answered
“yes” (i.e., those players j 6= i with θj = −θi and aj,k = 1), and (c) by whether he or
she wants to match or to mismatch that fraction (i.e., by the player’s gender θi).
We will assume in this example that there is a common type space T for all players
(i.e., Ti = T for all i ∈ I). Thus let T = Θ × Ω, where Θ = {−1, 1} and Ω is a set
of weight vectors. To make the example fit to our main result, we have to make sure
that the equicontinuity hypothesis on payoff functions in this result can be satisfied
when the number of players varies. For this purpose, we have to assume not just that
for each ω ∈ Ω the sum ∑∞k=0 ωk converges, but actually that this convergence is
uniform over the possible types of players. In view of this, for some fixed γ ∈ [0, 1]N
with
∑∞
k=0 γk <∞ we let Ω = {ω ∈ [0, 1]N : ωk ≤ γk for all k ∈ N}.
Towards an application of our main result, we also need to make the common
type space T of the players to be a compact metric space, and we need to make the
action spaces Ai to be closed subsets of a common compact metric space, so that,
in particular, the measurability and equicontinuity hypotheses made in this result on
the payoff functions are satisfied. To meet this requirement, we proceed as follows.
Let {0, 1}N be endowed with a metric that induces the product topology defined from
the discrete topology on {0, 1}, which makes {0, 1}N a compact metric space, and
assume that Ai is closed in {0, 1}N for all i ∈ I.7 Further, letting [0, γk] for all k ∈ N
7For instance, the set Ai defined above relative to the partition {Bj}∞j=0 of N satisfies this
closedness assumption.
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be endowed with the subspace topology defined from the usual topology of R, and
Θ with the discrete topology, we endow Ω =
∏∞
k=0[0, γk] and then T = Θ × Ω with
the product topology and a corresponding metric, so that Ω and T become compact
metric spaces.
Next, concerning type distribution, let νi, i ∈ I, be any Borel probability measures
on T such that the marginal νi,Θ of νi on Θ = {−1, 1} is degenerate for each i ∈ I,
and such that |{i ∈ I : νi,Θ = 11}| = |{i ∈ I : νi,Θ = 1−1}| = n/2. Note that this
ensures that the gender of a player is non-random and that the numbers of females
and males in the game are equal.
Finally, we formulate payoff functions in the notation of Section 2. To this end,
let S = T × {0, 1}N, and for any t = (θ, ω) ∈ T , let θ(t) = θ and ω(t) = ω. Further,
for any k ∈ N and θ ∈ Θ, let Bθk = {(t, a) ∈ S : θ(t) = θ and ak = 1}. Then, in the
notation of Section 2, for each player i the payoff as defined above can be described
by the payoff function vi : Ti × Ai ×Hi → R given by setting
vi(t, a, µ) = θ(t)
∞∑
k=0
ω(t)k
∣∣∣∣∣ak − 2(n− 1)µ(B−θ(t)k )n
∣∣∣∣∣
for (t, a, µ) ∈ Ti × Ai ×Hi. This completes the specification of the game G.
Now let
K =
{
v : T × {0, 1}N ×M(S)→ R : for some n ∈ N with n ≥ 2,
v(t, a, µ) = θ(t)
∞∑
k=0
ω(t)k
∣∣∣∣ak − 2(n− 1)µ(B−θ(t)k )n
∣∣∣∣
for all (t, a, µ) ∈ T × {0, 1}N ×M(S)
}
and consider M(S) as endowed with the narrow topology. Note that in the game
G defined above, the payoff function of any player i is just the restriction of some
element v of K to the set T × Ai ×Hi, this v being determined by the number n of
players. It is easily seen that all elements of K are measurable and thatK is uniformly
equicontinuous in the M(S)-component and bounded (see the Appendix for details).
Thus our main result implies that all Bayes-Nash equilibria of the matching game G
with infinite questions are approximately ex-post Nash provided that the number of
players is sufficiently large.
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4 Proof of the Theorem
The proof of our main result is based on several lemmas. Lemma 1 is a consequence of
492X(d) in Fremlin (2003) on combinatorial concentration of measures. Recall that if
X1, . . . , Xn are finitely many sets, the normalized Hamming metric dH on the product∏n
i=1Xi is given by dH(x, y) =
1
n
∣∣{i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n and xi 6= yi}∣∣ for all x, y ∈∏ni=1Xi.
Lemma 1. Let 〈(Xi,Σi, µi)〉ni=1 be a non-empty finite family of probability spaces
and (X,Λ, λ) the corresponding product probability space. Suppose that f : X → R
is a bounded λ-integrable function which is 2-Lipschitz for the normalized Hamming
metric on X. Then λ({x ∈ X : ∣∣f(x)− ∫ f dλ∣∣ ≥ γ}) ≤ 2e−nγ2/16 for every γ ≥ 0.
Proof. Set g = 1
2
f . Then g is 1-Lipschitz for the normalized Hamming metric on X,
and therefore, according to Fremlin (2003, 492X(d)), we must have
λ
({
x ∈ X : g(x)−
∫
g dλ ≥ γ
})
≤ e−nγ2/4
for every γ ≥ 0. It follows that
(1) λ
({
x ∈ X : f(x)−
∫
f dλ ≥ γ
})
≤ e−nγ2/16
for every γ ≥ 0. Since the function −f is also 2-Lipschitz for the normalized Hamming
metric on X, we must also have
λ
({
x ∈ X : −f(x)−
∫
−f dλ ≥ γ
})
≤ e−nγ2/16
for every γ ≥ 0, or, in other words,
(2) λ
({
x ∈ X : −
(
f(x)−
∫
f dλ
)
≥ γ
})
≤ e−nγ2/16
for every γ ≥ 0. The conclusion of the lemma follows by combining (1) and (2).
As a consequence of Lemma 1, the next lemma shows that if µi, i = 1, . . . , n, are
any Borel probability measures on S, then with high µ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ µn-probability, the
distribution 1
n
∑n
i=1 1s˜i on S is close to the average distribution
1
n
∑n
i=1 µi whenever
n is sufficiently large.
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Lemma 2. For all δ > 0 and η > 0, there is N ∈ N such that the following
holds for every n ≥ N : If µ1, . . . , µn are any Borel probability measures on S, then
µ˜({s˜ ∈ Sn : ρ( 1
n
∑n
i=1 1s˜i ,
1
n
∑n
i=1 µi) > δ}) ≤ η.
Proof. Let C(S) be the set of all real-valued continuous functions on S, and let
L = {h ∈ C(S) : ‖h‖∞ ≤ 1 and h is 1-Lipschitz}.
Let ρH denote Huntingdon’s metric on M(S). Recall that ρH is defined by setting
ρH(µ, µ
′) = sup{|∫ h dµ− ∫ h dµ′| : h ∈ L} for all µ, µ′ ∈ M(S), and recall that ρH
induces the narrow topology of M(S) (see Fremlin (2003, 437L and 437Y(i))). As
noted in Section 2, all metrics onM(S) that induce the narrow topology are uniformly
equivalent, so it suffices to show that the lemma holds with ρH as a particular choice
of the metric ρ.
Fix any δ, η > 0 and set γ = min{δ/3, η}. Note that the subset L of C(S) is
bounded, closed and equicontinuous, hence compact. We may therefore select finitely
many elements h1, . . . , hk of L so that for any h ∈ L we have ‖h−hj‖∞ ≤ γ for some
hj ∈ {h1, . . . , hk}. It is straightforward to check that
(3) ρH(µ, µ
′) ≤ δ for all µ, µ′ ∈M(S) satisfying∣∣∣∣∫ hj dµ− ∫ hj dµ′∣∣∣∣ ≤ γ for each j = 1, . . . , k.
Choose N ∈ N such that 2e−Nγ2/16 < γ/k. Fix any n ∈ N with n ≥ N , and any
Borel probability measures µ1, . . . , µn on S. Recall that µ˜ denotes the corresponding
product measure on Sn. For each j = 1, . . . , k, define a function h˜j : S
n → R by
setting
h˜j(s˜) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
hj(s˜i) for all s˜ = (s˜1, . . . , s˜n) ∈ Sn.
Since ‖hj‖∞ ≤ 1 for each j = 1, . . . , k, each of the functions h˜j is 2-Lipschitz for
the normalized Hamming metric on Sn. It is also clear that each h˜j is bounded and
µ˜-integrable. Using Lemma 1 it follows that
µ˜
({
s˜ ∈ Sn :
∣∣∣∣∫ h˜j dµ˜− h˜j(s˜)∣∣∣∣ ≥ γ}) ≤ 2e−nγ2/16 ≤ 2e−Nγ2/16 < γ/k
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for each j = 1, . . . , k, and hence that
(4) µ˜
({
s˜ ∈ Sn :
∣∣∣∣∫ h˜j dµ˜− h˜j(s˜)∣∣∣∣ < γ for each j = 1, . . . , k}) > 1− γ.
Note that for each s˜ = (s˜1, . . . , s˜n) ∈ Sn, and each j = 1, . . . , k,
(5) h˜j(s˜) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
hj(s˜i) =
∫
S
hj d
( 1
n
n∑
i=1
1s˜i
)
.
Also, for each j = 1, . . . , k, using Fubini’s theorem,∫
Sn
h˜j(s˜1, . . . , s˜n) dµ˜(s˜1, . . . , s˜n) =
1
n
∫
Sn
n∑
i=1
hj(s˜i) dµ˜(s˜1, . . . , s˜n)
=
1
n
∫
S
(
. . .
(∫
S
(∫
S
n∑
i=1
hj(s˜i) dµ1(s˜1)
)
dµ2(s˜2)
)
. . .
)
dµn(s˜n)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
∫
S
hj(s) dµi(s)
=
∫
S
hj d
( 1
n
n∑
i=1
µi
)
.
Hence, from (4) and (5),
µ˜
({
s˜ ∈ Sn :
∣∣∣∣∫
S
hj d
( 1
n
n∑
i=1
µi
)
−
∫
S
hj d
( 1
n
n∑
i=1
1s˜i
)∣∣∣∣ < γ, ∀j = 1, . . . , k})> 1− γ.
By (3), it follows that
µ˜
({
s˜ ∈ Sn : ρH
( 1
n
n∑
i=1
µi,
1
n
n∑
i=1
1s˜i
)
≤ δ
})
> 1− γ.
Since γ ≤ η, this implies that
µ˜
({
s˜ ∈ Sn : ρH
( 1
n
n∑
i=1
µi,
1
n
n∑
i=1
1s˜i
)
≤ δ
})
> 1− η.
This completes the proof.
The next lemma shows that the conclusion of Lemma 2 remains valid when only
n − 1 of the measures µ1, . . . , µn are averaged out. This is a consequence of the fact
that when n is large, removing one element from the average makes little difference.
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Lemma 3. For all δ > 0 and η > 0, there is N ∈ N such that the following holds
for every n ≥ N : If µ1, . . . , µn are Borel probability measures on S, then there is a
measurable subset E of Sn, with µ˜(E) ≥ 1 − η, such that for each s˜ ∈ E and each
i ∈ I = {1, . . . , n}, ρ( 1
n−1
∑
j∈I\{i} 1s˜j ,
1
n−1
∑
j∈I\{i} µj
) ≤ δ.
Proof. Fix δ > 0. We can find N1 ∈ N such that for every n ≥ N1 the following is
true: Whenever γ1, . . . , γn are Borel probability measures on S, then for each i ∈ I =
{1, . . . , n},
ρ
(
1
n− 1
∑
j∈I\{i}
γj,
1
n
∑
j∈I
γj
)
≤ δ/3.
To see this, recall that the Prohorov metric ρP on M(S) is defined by setting, for any
γ, γ′ ∈M(S),
ρP (γ, γ
′) = inf{ε > 0: γ(E) ≤ γ′(Bε(E)) + ε and
γ′(E) ≤ γ(Bε(E)) + ε for all Borel sets E ⊆ S},
where Bε(E) is the open ε-ball around E for the metric of S, and recall that ρP
generates the narrow topology. Note that for any γ1, . . . , γn as above, with n ≥ 2, and
any i ∈ I = {1, . . . , n}, we have∣∣∣∣ 1n− 1 ∑
j∈I\{i}
γj(E)− 1
n
∑
j∈I
γj(E)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1n
for all Borel sets E ⊆ S, and therefore ρP
(
1
n−1
∑
j∈I\{i} γj,
1
n
∑
j∈I γj
) ≤ 1/n. Again
using the fact that all metrics on M(S) that generate the narrow topology are uni-
formly equivalent, the assertion follows.
Now by Lemma 2, we can find N2 ∈ N such that for every n ≥ N2 the following
holds: Whenever µ1, . . . , µn are Borel probability measures on S, then there is a
measurable subset E of Sn with µ˜(E) ≥ 1− η such that for each s˜ ∈ E,
ρ
(
1
n
∑
j∈I
1s˜j ,
1
n
∑
j∈I
µj
)
≤ δ/3.
Setting N = max{N1, N2} gives us the desired N .
The previous lemma shows that if n is large and µ1, . . . , µn are any Borel proba-
bility measures on S, then, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the distribution 1
n−1
∑
j 6=i 1s˜j on S
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is close to the average distribution 1
n−1
∑
j 6=i µi with high µ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ µn-probability.
This fact will be used below (see Lemma 5) to show that, for all types and actions
of any player i, his expected payoff against the mixed strategies (µj)j 6=i of the other
players is close to the payoff against the average distribution 1
n−1
∑
j 6=i µj, provided
this average distribution belongs to the domain of his payoff function vi. However, in a
semi-anonymous Bayesian game G = (Ti, Ai, νi, vi)i∈I , for each i ∈ I, player i’s payoff
function is defined on Si×Hi and there is no guarantee that the average distribution
1
n−1
∑
j 6=i µj belongs to Hi. We therefore extend players payoff functions from Si×Hi
to Si ×M(S).
Lemma 4. Let K ⊆ C be uniformly equicontinuous in the M(S)-component and
bounded. Suppose that for each v ∈ K, dom(v) = Sv × Hv, where Sv and Hv are
closed subsets of S and M(S) respectively. Then each v ∈ K has an extension to an
element v′ ∈ C with dom(v′) = Sv × M(S) such that the set K ′ ⊆ C of all these
extensions is again uniformly equicontinuous in the M(S)-component and bounded.
Proof. Indexing the elements of K, we can write {vi : i ∈ I} for K (here, I is an
abstract index set) and then, for each i ∈ I, Si×Hi for dom(vi). We may assume that
each vi takes all of its values in [1, 2]. Following Mandelkern (1990), for each i ∈ I
define v′i : Si ×M(S)→ [1, 2] by setting v′i(s, µ) = vi(s, µ) if µ ∈ Hi, and
v′i(s, µ) = inf
u∈Hi
vi(s, u)ρ(µ, u)
ρ(µ,Hi)
if µ 6∈ Hi. Then each v′i takes all of its values in [1, 2], and because {vi : i ∈ I}
is uniformly equicontinuous in the M(S)-component, the proof of the theorem in
Mandelkern (1990) shows that {v′i : i ∈ I} must be uniformly equicontinuous in the
M(S)-component. Thus it remains to show that for each i ∈ I, v′i is measurable on
its domain Si ×M(S).
Pick any i ∈ I. Since for each fixed s ∈ Si, v′i(s, ·) is continuous on M(S), by
Aliprantis and Border (2006, Lemma 4.51, p. 153) it suffices to show that for each
fixed µ ∈ M(S), v′i(·, µ) is measurable on Si. If µ ∈ Hi, this holds since in this case
v′i(·, µ) coincides with vi(·, µ). Thus consider µ 6∈ Hi. Let D be a countable dense
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subset of Hi. Since the function u 7→ vi(s, u)ρ(µ, u)/ρ(µ,Hi) : Hi → R is continuous
for each s ∈ Si, we have
v′i(s, µ) = inf
u∈Hi
vi(s, u)ρ(µ, u)
ρ(µ,Hi)
= inf
u∈D
vi(s, u)ρ(µ, u)
ρ(µ,Hi)
for each s ∈ Si. Since s 7→ vi(s, u) is measurable on Si for each u ∈ D, it follows that
s 7→ v′i(s, µ) is measurable as well.
The next lemma implies, in particular, that the following holds if n is sufficiently
large: Whenever (σ1, . . . , σn) is a mixed strategy in a semi-anonymous Bayesian game,
then, for all players i ∈ I, types t ∈ Ti and actions a ∈ Ai, player i’s expected payoff
when of type t and playing a against the mixed strategies of the other players is, for
his extended payoff function, close to the certain payoff against the average distribu-
tion 1
n−1
∑
j 6=i σj. The following notation is used in the sequel: domS(v) denotes the
projection of dom(v) on S.
Lemma 5. Let K be a subset of C. Suppose that K is uniformly equicontinuous in the
M(S)-component and bounded, and that for each v ∈ K, dom(v) = domS(v)×M(S).
Then, for all ε > 0, there is an N ∈ N such that the following holds for every
n ≥ N : If σ1, . . . , σn are Borel probability measures on S, then, for each v ∈ K, each
s ∈ domS(v), and each i ∈ I = {1, . . . , n},∣∣∣∣v(s, 1n− 1 ∑
j∈I\{i}
σj
)
−
∫
Sn
v
(
s˜i,
1
n− 1
∑
j∈I\{i}
1s˜j
)
dσ˜is(s˜)
∣∣∣∣ < ε.
Proof. Note first that the integral
∫
Sn
v
(
s˜i,
1
n−1
∑
j∈I\{i} 1s˜j
)
dσ˜is(s˜) is indeed defined if
s ∈ domS(v). To see this, observe that we have σ˜is({s˜ ∈ Sn : s˜i = s}) = 1 by definition
of σ˜is. Hence, if s ∈ domS(v), then σ˜is
({s˜ ∈ Sn : (s˜i, 1n−1∑j∈I\{i} 1s˜j) ∈ dom(v)}) = 1,
because dom(v) = domS(v)×M(S) by hypothesis.
Fix any ε > 0. By hypothesis, we can choose a numbers δ, η > 0 such that
2η sup{‖v‖∞ : v ∈ K} < ε/2 and such that for all v ∈ K, |v(s, µ) − v(s, µ′)| < ε/2
whenever (s, µ), (s, µ′) ∈ dom(v) satisfy ρ(µ, µ′) < δ.
Relative to these δ and η, let N be chosen according to Lemma 3. Fix any n ≥
N and let σ1, . . . , σn be any Borel probability measures on S. Pick any v ∈ K,
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any s ∈ domS(v), and any i ∈ I = {1, . . . , n}. Lemma 3 applied to the measures
σ1, . . . , σi−1, 1s, σi+1, . . . , σn gives a measurable set E ⊆ Sn with σ˜is(E) ≥ 1 − η such
that ρ
(
1
n−1
∑
j∈I\{i} 1s˜j ,
1
n−1
∑
j∈I\{i} σj
) ≤ δ for each s˜ ∈ E. Hence, by choice of δ,
since σ˜is({s˜ ∈ Sn : s˜i = s}) = 1, it follows that
σ˜is
({
s˜ ∈ Sn :
∣∣∣∣v(s, 1n− 1 ∑
j∈I\{i}
σj
)
− v
(
s˜i,
1
n− 1
∑
j∈I\{i}
1s˜j
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε/2}) ≥ 1− η.
Since 2η‖v‖∞ < ε/2, it follows from this that∣∣∣∣v(s, 1n− 1 ∑
j∈I\{i}
σj
)
−
∫
Sn
v
(
s˜i,
1
n− 1
∑
j∈I\{i}
1s˜j
)
dσ˜is(s˜)
∣∣∣∣ < ε.
As i ∈ I, v ∈ K, and s ∈ domS(v) were arbitrary, the lemma is proved.
The next lemma shows that if σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, then
for each i ∈ I, the maximal conditional expected payoff of player i given that his type
is t and the other players play according to (σ1, . . . , σn) is attained for νi-almost all
t ∈ Ti.
Lemma 6. Let G = (Ti, Ai, νi, vi)i∈I be a semi-anonymous Bayesian game and sup-
pose that σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of G. Then, for each i ∈ I,
there is a Borel set Fi ⊆ Ti × Ai, with σi(Fi) = 1, such that if s = (t, a) ∈ Fi, then∫Q
j∈I Sj
vi
(
s˜i,
1
n−1
∑
j∈I\{i} 1s˜j
)
dσ˜is(s˜) = mi(t, σ).
Proof. Consider any i ∈ I. Let A denote the Borel σ-algebra of Ai, B that of Ti, ν¯i the
completion of νi, and Bνi the domain of ν¯i. Furthermore, let σ˜−i denote the product
measure σ1⊗· · ·⊗σi−1⊗σi+1⊗· · ·⊗σn on
∏
j∈I\i Sj, let s˜−i denote a generic element
of
∏
j∈I\i Sj, and let g : Ai × Ti → R be the function defined by setting
g(t, a) =
∫
Q
j∈I\{i} Sj
vi
(
(t, a),
1
n− 1
∑
j∈I\{i}
1s˜j
)
dσ˜−i(s˜−i) for all (t, a) ∈ Ti × Ai.
Since vi is bounded, using Fubini’s theorem it follows that g is B ⊗ A-measurable.
Moreover, for any mixed strategy σ′i of player i, the expected payoff of player i when
the other players play σ−i is
∫
Si
g dσ′i.
Note that sup{g(t, a) : a ∈ Ai} = mi(t, σ) for each t ∈ Ti. Hence, since g is B⊗A-
measurable it follows from Castaing and Valadier (1977, Lemma III.39 and remarks
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in the sequel) that t 7→ mi(t, σ) is Bνi-measurable, and that for any ε > 0 there is a
(Bνi ,Ai)-measurable hε : Ti → Ai such that
∫
g(t, hε(t)) dν¯i(t) ≥
∫
mi(t, σ) dν¯i(t) −
ε. Given such a function hε, let σεi be the Borel probability measure on Ti × Ai
defined by setting σεi (B) = ν¯i({t ∈ Ti : (t, hε(t)) ∈ B}) for each B ∈ B ⊗ A. Then
the marginal of σεi on Ti is νi, and thus σ
ε
i is a mixed strategy of player i. Also,∫
g dσεi =
∫
g(t, hε(t)) dν¯i(t) and hence
∫
g dσεi ≥
∫
mi(t, σ) dν¯i(t) − ε. Since σ is a
Bayes-Nash equilibrium,
∫
g dσi ≥
∫
g dσεi . It follows that
∫
g dσi ≥
∫
mi(t, σ) dν¯i(t).
The property of mi(·, σ) being Bνi-measurable means that there is B ∈ B with
νi(B) = 0 such that the restriction of mi(·, σ) to Ti\B is Borel measurable. Choose
such B and let
Fi = {(t, a) ∈ (Ti\B)× Ai : g(t, a) = mi(t, σ)}.
Then Fi is a Borel set in Ti × Ai. By the facts that the marginal of σi on Ti is νi,
which in particular implies that σi(B × Ai) = 0, and that g(t, a) ≤ mi(t, σ) for all
(t, a) ∈ Ti × Ai, we see that were σi(Fi) < 1, we would have∫
g dσi <
∫
mi(t, σ) dν¯i(t) ,
contradicting what has been established in the previous paragraph. Thus, σi(Fi) = 1.
To complete the proof, it only remains to note that for each s = (t, a) ∈ Ti × Ai,
g(t, a) =
∫
Q
j∈I Sj
vi
(
s˜i,
1
n− 1
∑
j∈I\{i}
1s˜j
)
dσ˜is(s˜) .
We finally turn to the proof of our main result.
Proof of the Theorem. Fix ε > 0 and 0 < η < 1. Let K ′ ⊆ C be chosen for K
according to Lemma 4. Using Lemma 5 and Lemma 3, we can select N ∈ N such that
the following hold for all n ≥ N and any given Borel probability measures µ1, . . . , µn
on S, setting I = {1, . . . , n}:
(I) For each v ∈ K ′, each s ∈ domS(v), and each i ∈ I,∣∣∣∣v(s, 1n− 1 ∑
j∈I\{i}
µj
)
−
∫
Sn
v
(
s˜i,
1
n− 1
∑
j∈I\{i}
1s˜j
)
dµ˜is(s˜)
∣∣∣∣ < ε/4
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(the integral being defined, see the beginning of the proof of Lemma 5).
(II) There is a measurable E ⊆ Sn, with µ˜(E) > 1−η, such that if (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ E,
then for each v ∈ K ′, s ∈ domS(v), and i ∈ I,∣∣∣∣v(s, 1n− 1 ∑
j∈I\{i}
µj
)− v(s, 1
n− 1
∑
j∈I\{i}
1sj
)∣∣∣∣ < ε/4.
Fix n ≥ N , and suppose (σ1, . . . , σn) is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of a game G
with a finite set I = {1, . . . , n} of players whose payoff functions vi belong to K. By
Lemma 6, for each i ∈ I we can choose a measurable Fi ⊆ Si with σi(Fi) = 1 such
that:
(III) If s = (t, a) ∈ Fi, then
∫Q
j∈I Sj
vi
(
s˜i,
1
n−1
∑
j∈I\{i} 1s˜j
)
dσ˜is(s˜) = mi(t, σ).
Choose E ⊆ Sn relative to (σ1, . . . , σn) according to (II) above, and then let
F = E ∩ (F1 × · · · × Fn).
Note that σ˜(F ) = σ˜(E). Thus, σ˜(F ) > 1− η.
Consider any (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ F and any player i ∈ I. Let ti = t(si). Identify vi with
its extension to an element of K ′. Then, by choice of E and by (I),
vi
(
si,
1
n− 1
∑
j∈I\{i}
1sj
)
≥ vi
(
si,
1
n− 1
∑
j∈I\{i}
σj
)
− ε/4
≥
∫
Q
j∈I Sj
vi
(
s˜i,
1
n− 1
∑
j∈I\{i}
1s˜j
)
dσ˜isi(s˜)− ε/2.
Since si ∈ Fi, it follows from this and (III) that
vi
(
si,
1
n− 1
∑
j∈I\{i}
1sj
)
≥ mi(ti, σ)− ε/2.
On the other hand, for any s ∈ Si such that t(s) = ti, using the choice of E, (I) and
the definition of mi(ti, σ) in this order, we obtain that
vi
(
s,
1
n− 1
∑
j∈I\{i}
1sj
)
≤ vi
(
s,
1
n− 1
∑
j∈I\{i}
σj
)
+ ε/4
≤
∫
Q
j∈I Sj
vi
(
s˜i,
1
n− 1
∑
j∈I\{i}
1s˜j
)
dσ˜is(s˜) + ε/2 ≤ mi(ti, σ) + ε/2.
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In particular, we must have
vi
(
si,
1
n− 1
∑
j∈I\{i}
1sj
)
≤ mi(ti, σ) + ε/2.
Summing up, it follows that
∣∣vi(si, 1n−1∑j∈I\{i} 1sj) −mi(ti, σ)∣∣ ≤ ε/2, and that for
any s ∈ Si with t(s) = ti,
vi
(
s,
1
n− 1
∑
j∈I\{i}
1sj
)
≤ mi(ti, σ) + ε/2
≤ vi
(
si,
1
n− 1
∑
j∈I\{i}
1sj
)
+ ε.
Thus, as i ∈ I was arbitrary, (s1, . . . , sn) is ε-Nash in G and
∣∣vi(si, 1n−1∑j∈I\{i} 1sj)−
mi(t(si), σ)
∣∣ ≤ ε for each player i. As (s1, . . . , sn) was an arbitrary element of F and
σ˜(F ) > 1 − η, we may conclude that (σ1, . . . , σn) is an (ε, η)-ex post equilibrium of
G. This completes the proof.
A Appendix
In this appendix we prove the assertions made at the ends of Sections 3.1 and 3.2
about the sets K defined there.
A.1 Cournot Oligopoly
To see that the set K defined at the end of Section 3.1 has the properties claimed
there, note first that the mapping µ 7→ ∫
S
proj[0,m] dµ from M(S) to R is continuous
because S and hence M(S) are compact. Combining this fact with the fact that the
function P is continuous, and that [0,m] and M(S) are compact, it is plain that the
set K of functions is uniformly equicontinuous in the M(S)-component.
Next note that as the set T of functions is endowed with the (relativized) sup-
norm topology, the mapping t 7→ t(a) from T to R is continuous for each a ∈ [0,m].
Thus since T , being compact, is separable, and since each element of T is measurable,
the mapping (t, a) 7→ t(a) from T × [0,m] to R is measurable. Combining this fact
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with the fact that (a, µ) 7→ P
(
1
n
a +
(
1 − 1
n
) ∫
S
proj[0,m] dµ
)
is continuous and hence
measurable, it follows that each function v ∈ K is measurable.
Finally, since the function P is bounded (being a continuous function on [0,m]),
and since the set T is bounded (being a set of bounded functions on [0,m] that is
compact for the sup-norm), the set K of functions is bounded as well.
A.2 A Matching Game with Infinite Questions
We show that the set K of functions defined in Section 3.2 is bounded and uniformly
equicontinuous in the M(S)-component, and that all of its elements are measurable.
To this end, note first that
∣∣ak − λµ(B−θ(t)k )∣∣ ≤ 2 for each λ ∈ [1, 2] and each
k ∈ N. We may therefore define a function v˜ : [1, 2]× S ×M(S)→ R by
v˜(λ, (t, a), µ) = θ(t)
∞∑
k=0
ω(t)k
∣∣ak − λµ(B−θ(t)k )∣∣.
The function v˜ is continuous. To see this, just note the following facts, which are
immediate by the definitions and the topologies of the spaces involved:
1. The function (λ, (t, a), µ) 7→ θ(t)〈∣∣ak − λµ(B−θ(t)k )∣∣〉k∈N from [1, 2]× S ×M(S)
into [−2, 2]N is continuous when [−2, 2]N is endowed with the product topology.
(Note that for all k ∈ N and θ ∈ Θ, the set B−θk is open and closed in S, which
implies that µ 7→ µ(B−θk ) is continuous. Also note that if ti → t in T , then
θ(ti) ∈ {−1,−1} must eventually be constant.)
2. The function (λ, (t, a), µ) 7→ 〈ω(t)k〉k∈N from [1, 2]×S×M(S) into Ω is contin-
uous.
3. The function (ω, u) 7→∑∞k=0 ωk ·uk from Ω× [−2, 2]N into R is continuous when
[−2, 2]N is endowed with the product topology.
Now since v˜ is continuous and its domain is compact, the set {v˜(λ, ·, ·) : λ ∈ [1, 2]}
is a bounded set of continuous and therefore measurable functions on S × M(S).
The fact that v˜ is continuous and its domain [1, 2] × S × M(S) is compact also
implies that the set {v˜(λ, (t, a), ·) : λ ∈ [1, 2], (t, a) ∈ S} is a uniformly equicontinuous
26
set of functions on M(S). Evidently for the set K defined in Section 3.2 we have
K ⊆ {v˜(λ, ·, ·) : λ ∈ [1, 2]}, showing that K is uniformly equicontinuous in the M(S)-
component and bounded, with all of its elements being measurable.
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